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Notes
Security Council Resolutions in United States Courts
Domestic suits based on United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions should increase in number over the next few years especially if
the definition of mandatory obligations of the United Nations Charter,'
adopted by the International Court of Justice [I.C.J.] in the 1971 South
West Africa litigation,2 gains increased acceptance." Diggs v. Shultz' is
the only case to date which has raised the issue of the force of mandatory
Security Council resolutions in courts of the United States. Diggs was
brought to compel the Secretary of the Treasury to prevent the impor-
tation into the United States of Rhodesian metallurgical chromite, a
commodity subject to a mandatory embargo imposed by the Security
Council.
Recently a California district court had the opportunity to rule
on the significance of the General Assembly and Security Council termin-
ation of South Africa's Mandate' over Namibia (South West Africa).'
Stockholders of American Metal Climax were seeking an injunction
against the corporation's payment of taxes to South Africa for its
Namibian mining operations. The grounds for the action were that such
taxes are illegal in light of the termination of South Africa's Mandate
over Namibia, and that such payment therefore constitutes waste. While
I Opened for signature June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945), T.S. No. 993.
2 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia, Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
[1971] I.C.J. 16, 52 110 [hereinafter cited as 1971 S.W.A. Ca;e].
8 See text at notes 37-40 infra.
4470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
5 After World War I the League of Nations placed the former German territory
of South West Africa under the administration of the Union o' South Africa. At the
inception of the United Nations all the other Mandatories arrarged to place their terri-
tories under the nominal supervision of the United Nations. South Africa refused,
arguing that its international responsibilities regarding the Mandate ceased upon the dis-
solution of the League of Nations. After tvo decades of legal skirmishes over the
status of South West Africa, the General Assembly, the successor to the League of Na-
tions Council, withdrew the Mandate from South Africa in 196t. For a history of the
South West Africa litigation see J. DUGAizD, THE SourH WESI AFRiCA/NAmrBiA Dis-
PruTE (1973).
South West Africa's name was changed to Namibia in 1966.
0 Schott v. American Metal Climax, Inc., Civil No. C73-16'55 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 11,
1973).
The case was dismissed for failure to state a cause of oction and the plaintiffs
elected not to appeal. However, the complaint, aside from listing the United Nations
resolutions on the subject, made no attempt to show how those rcsolutions could be bind-
ing on a U.S. court, either through treaty law or customary international law.
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the case was summarily dismissed the court did not explain why the
resolutions did not give rise to an action for waste.
The force of Security Council resolutions could also be raised if an
action were brought by the United Nations itself to claim title to
Namibian products exported to the United States.! Also presently
feasible would be suits to enjoin, or compel disclosure of, a financial
institution's investments in the huge Portuguese hydroelectric project
in Mozambique which is expected to benefit substantially Southern
Rhodesia in violation of the Rhodesian sanctions.8
This note will examine the effect of mandatory Security Council
resolutions in US. law and the impact of those resolutions on domestic
litigation involving national and international human rights problems.
The subject will be dealt with in two parts. The first will examine the
legal character of'Security Council resolutions under the United Nations
Charter and under U.S. treaty law in order to develop an analysis
which strengthens the position of Security Council resolutions in U.S.
law. The second part of the discussion will be devoted to the relation-
ship of mandatory resolutions to United States domestic doctrines re-
garding self-executing treaties and political questions. Here it will be
necessary to review briefly the history of Charter litigation in the United
States. Throughout the note, the Security Council resolutions which
imposed the economic embargo on Rhodesia and which terminated
South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa will be examined
for their potential impact on current and future cases.'
JURIDICAL NATURE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
A mandatory resolution consented to by a U.S. representative in
7 Comment, The Right of the United Nations to Bring Actions in Municipal Courts
in Order to Claim Title to Namibian (South West African) Products Exported Abroad,
66 Am. J. INT'L L. 600 (1972).
1 Recent events in Portugal and the anticipated succession to power of FRELIMO
in Mozambique may obviate the need for such action. However, a substantial segment
of the white Portuguese settlers there have been involved in an attempt to partition
Mozambique along the northern bank of the Zambezi thereby to retain the Cabora Bassa
dam for White Southern Africa. If, with the probable support of South Africa, such
partition should occur, the issue will remain pertinent.
9 This note will be limited to the legal effect of Security Council resolutions, except
where the legislative competence of the Genral Assmbly to bind individual states is rela-
tively clear, as in the termination of the Mandate over South West Africa. This note
argues that a mandatory Security Council resolution has domestic force primarily be-
cause it is an extension of a treaty. If, however, the content of the resolution expresses
pror legal expectations the resolution is binding both through treaty law and customary
international law. Cf. Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-Citation of General As-
sembly Resolutions, 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 444 (1969) ; Falk On the Quasi-Legislative Com-
petence of the General Assembly, 60 Am. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966). Most General Assem-
bly resolutions, on the other hand, are binding only through the latter approach and thus
are juridically dissimilar.
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the Security Council is not a statute. Nor is it an Executive order or
policy statement since its force comes from the fact that other nations
were involved in its creation. Even though a necessary implication of
the D.C. Circuit's holding in Diggs is that such a resolution is a treaty
obligation," no attempt was made to demonstrate the juridical connec-
tions between the two. The court, without explanation, assumed that
a resolution could be a treaty commitment of the United States binding
on domestic courts even though it was clearly not part of the original
charter which is the operative treaty. Absent also were any distinctions
which would distinguish a resolution having the force of a decision
from one raising only a recommendation.
The Charter as the constitutive document of the United Nations
has constitutional force within the organization. Resolutions enacted
under it bind the organization. It obligates member states, however, as
a treaty,"' not as a constitution. Resolutions obtain their mandatory
character over member states by their promulgation under the authority
of a Charter provision which is itself mandatory, owing either to the
intention of the framers or to the legal expectations' which arise around
Charter provisions. The resolution amounts to art application of the
treaty itself under which the power of the organization to adopt resolu-
tions is established."
10 Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
21 J. CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 6 (1969). The
Charter was submitted to the Senate on July 2, 1945, as a treaty and was so considered
during the debates. 91 CONG. REC. 7119 (1945) (remarks of Scnator Barkley).
12 Modern international law rejects positivistic definitions v ;iich would restrict legal
content to international custom or treaty. Instead international law is conceived of as a
pattern of expectations concerning the way governments or international organizations
will react to political, economic and social problems. If such ecpectations are normally
satisfied a pattern emerges sufficiently stable to be called law. For further discussion,
see Falk, The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conception of International Legal
Order, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 32 (R. Falk & C. Black
eds. 1969).
13 CASTANEDA, supra note 11, at 2.
Clive Parry suggests that the tendency to treat the products of international organi-
zations as treaties is an outgrowth of the practice of international conferences from
which such organizations arose. The decisions of the conferences were not binding unless
treaties were concluded there and afterwards ratified. In searching for the source of
legal obligations Parry prefers to approach the products of international organizations
as examples of state practice rather than treaty law. SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 110, 113 (1965). There is much merit in this poition, even as applied to
the special situation of the Security Council. It provides a comprehensive juridical
framework for all resolutions, allowing their binding effect to be determined by the
strength of the custom they generate. See note 9 supra.
There are, however, two problems with applying this appro:Lch to Security Council
resolutions. First, the customary law-making theory of resolutions of international
organizations is based on the fact that nearly all nations are members and thus the reso-
lution reflects the will of most world governments. Since only 15 countries sit on the
19741
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Because the Charter is a treaty and resolutions are extensions of
it, governments are bound vis-a-vis the organization and other govern-
ments through the general principle of international law, pacta suint
servanda," to resolutions enacted under articles of the Charter which
authorize mandatory action.
If the Charter is to be applied in a domestic court, its authority in
domestic law should also be examined.' It has been argued that in
U.S. domestic law the legal character of a resolution promulgated by an
international organization is simply that of an executive agreement
enacted under the Executive's own constitutional powers. 6 The organ-
ization itself is merely a forum for negotiating the agreement." This
analysis best applies to mandatory Security Council resolutions which
become binding 8 after the United States has had the opportunity'to veto
them. If the United States vetoes the resolution, no agreement would
be made. The executive agreement analysis, however, could not apply
to a recommendatory resolution which could come into force without
Security Council at any given time, no international consensus can be claimed for a
proposition arising from the Security Council without its subsequent invocation by the
General Assembly. In terms of U.S. courts the customary law analysis of Security
Council resolutions is not as strong as the treaty analysis because of the Supreme Court's
reluctance to "discover" international customary law given substantial controversy about
its existence. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See also R.
FALx, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1964). If
there is no consensus as to the existence of a custom as evidenced by resolutions, the
treaty analysis has a better chance of domestic judicial acceptance.
14 "Agreements are binding."
15 It is not possible to draw a domestic analogy from the experience of the European
Common Market. The E.E.C. is a sui generis legal order created by the transfer of leg-
islative power through the treaty process. Because the power to legislate in certain areas
has been transferred, the acts and regulations of the Community-the secondary law-
supercede municipal law by their own force and not through the conduit of a treaty.
Preliminary Ruling No. 6/64 (Flaninio Costa v. E.N.E.L.) [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R.
425, 443, 456 (1964) ; see Dagtoglou, European Communities and Constitutional Law, 32
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 256, 257 (1973). See generally Behr, Law of the European Communities
and Municipal Law, 34 MODERN L. REv. 481, 482-84 (1971).
16 L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 194 (1972).
An executive agreement, like a treaty, is an international agreement. No attempt
will be made here to distinguish the two. Attempts to delimit their scope elsewhere have
been singularly unsuccessful. For such an attempt, see note 129 infra.
7 As Henkin puts it:
It could hardly make a constitutional difference that U.S. representatives
reach international agreements within some organ of an international organiza-
tion, rather than negotiating a formal agreement in a plenipotentiary conference.
HENKIN, supra note 16, at 194.
18 There is no reason why executive agreement analysis cannot apply to resolutions
in the General Assembly to which the United States assents, though no treaty analysis
would be possible here because the Charter for the most part does not authorize binding
consequences for action by the Assembly. Henkin's argument in fact refers specifcally
to resolutions of "international organizations," which as a rule do not have mandatory
powers, rather than to those of the Security Council. Id.
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U.S. concurrence. International lawyers object that this definition of
"agreement" hardly describes the precise and arduous process involved
in the promulgation of international agreements. 9 In its international
aspect such a use of the "agreement" analysis might be suspect. How-
ever, the international law of treaties and the U.S. constitutional position
on treaties and agreements are not identical. The former is primarily a
set of general principles and specific rules whereby treaties may be
promulgated, interpreted, and enforced in the international arena. In
domestic law, characterization of executive action as an international
agreement also describes an allocation of competences within the
federal government. It is to this aspect of the domestic law of inter-
national agreements that the executive agreement analysis relates. Such
a definition legitimizes certain executive actions in the international
arena.
It has also been suggested that resolutions of international organi-
zations may be seen domestically as "implementations of the original
treaty which established the organization and gave it regulatory
powers."20 Apparently, "implementation" means an executive agreement
made pursuant to a treaty.2 This analysis parallels the international
process from which Security Council resolutions derive their legal
force. Third, any resolution involving Chapter VII' powers (sanc-
10 We are accustomed to think of international agreements irt written form partially
because the term is inaccurately regarded as a synonym for trezties and because recent
efforts in this field have focused on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
signed for U.S. on April 24, 1970, but not yet ratified, Sen. Exec. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
Nov. 22, 1971, 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969), 8 INT'L LEG. MAT. 679 at 681 (1969). This
Convention excludes agreements not in writing. Id. at art. III. Oral statements, never-
theless, may be equally binding. See The Hyde Park Agreement, Joint Statement of
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister MacKenzie King. 4 DF'ET STATE BuLL. 494
(1941), and the oral declaration of the Norwegian Foreign Minister in the Legal Status
of Eastern Greenland Case, [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53.
20 HENxiN, supra note 16, at 195.
21The case cited for this proposition involves such an agreement. Wilson v. Girard,
354 U.S. 524 (1957). See also RESTATEENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 119 (1965) (hereinafter cited as RESTATEm:.NT).
22 Chapter VII. Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression.
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommenda-
tions, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordanc, with Article 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and securit,.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not inx olving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call
upon Members of the United Nations to apply such measure.. These may in-
elude complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
1974]
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tions) could be seen as an executive agreement authorized by Act of
Congress, since the United Nations Participation Act of 194523 spe-
cifically delegates power to the President to impose sanctions voted
under Chapter VII.24
The last two approaches emphasizing either executive agreements
pursuant to a treaty or an Act of Congress are preferable in a time when
the power of the President to conclude executive agreements is being
challenged since both recognize some role for the legislature in the
treaty-resolution process.25 If the resolution is an executive agreement
authorized by treaty, the Senate at least can be said to assent to resolu-
tions arising out of the Security Council by having consented to the
Charter. An additional advantage of this approach is that a resolution
would have the same effect as a treaty-it would supersede pre-
vious statutes on the subject.26 The same is true if the resolution is
seen as an executive agreement authorized by Act of Congress since
an act of Congress supersedes a previous act. In contrast, an executive
agreement pursuant to the President's constitutional authority would not
supersede previous acts ; 7 therefore, the pure executive agreement ap-
proach would limit the potential scope of a resolution in U.S. law, since
the resolution would not be superior to existing statutes. On the other
hand the presidential prerogative definition should not be rejected out of
hand. In a situation where Congress has failed to act (as opposed
to acting by withdrawing implementation as was the case in Diggs28),
independent presidential power could justify the binding effect of a
Security Council resolution. In any event the purpose of assigning a
Security Council resolution the status of an executive agreement is to
traverse what would otherwise be a constitutional problem raised by
the fact that treaties need the consent of the Senate, and some inter-
national agreements need the consent of Congress, whereas a resolution
is presented to neither for a vote.
Before a resolution of the Security Council can have a binding
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance
of diplomatic relations.
2322 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1970).
24 Such delegation was previously upheld in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
25 For the advantages to be found in the constitutional fluidity of the foreign affairs
power, see Fatouros, National Procedures for Giving Effect to International Agreements,
in LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION
399, 421-23 (J. Hazard & W. Wagner eds. 1974) ; Wright, The Power of the Executive
to Use Military Force Abroad, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 43, 54-55 (1969).
26 RESTATEMtENT §§ 119, 142.2
7Id. § 144.
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effect on individuals by way of U.S. treaty obligations in a U.S. court,
it must spring from a Charter provision which compels the adherence
of member states." Article 2430 of the United Nations Charter confers
primary responsibility on the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security and lists the specific powers to be
found in Chapters VI (Peaceful Settlement of Disputes), VII (Action
with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts
of Agression), VIII (Regional Arrangements), and XII (Interna-
tional Trusteeship System). Article 2581 binds members to carry out the
decisioms of the Security Council. Thus, in order to know when mem-
bers are obligated, it is necessary to know when a Security Council action
is a decision and whether the Charter empowered the Security Council
to make that decision.
There are three alternative interpretations of the Charter regard-
ing the kinds of Security Council resolutions which mandate compliance
by member states. The first position holds that action under any of
the powers specifically enumerated in Article 24 may be the basis for a
decision.2 This will be called the specific Article 24 approach. Until
recently, however, the most common definition of what action is man-
datory under the Charter has been more narrowly defined. This narrower
position holds that a resolution which derives its authority from
Chapter VII is mandatory because the wording of only that Chapter
specifically authorizes the Security Council to make a decision capable
of triggering the application of Article 25. Since Chapter VI contains
no explicit authorization for decisions, only recommendations which
have no legal consequences for member states could be taken under it.
However, as Rosalyn Higgins has demonstrated,"3 the idea that Article
2 8 See note 117 infra.
29 Additionally, resolutions which are recommendatory in nature may become binding
if repeated and recited enough to become, through the expectations built up around them,
norms of customary law. Cf. authorities cited note 9 supra. But see note 13 supra.
20 1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the main-
tenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its
duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers
granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these dudes are laid down
in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.31 "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council in accordance with present Charter."
32 Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions Are Bind-
ing Under Article 25 of the Charter?, 21 INT'L & Conp. L.Q. 270, 279 (1972). As wilL
be evident, many of the comments in this section on mandatory resolutions come from
this seminal article.
33Id.
1974]
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25 could apply only to Chapter VII actions is clearly not warranted by
the wording of the Charter, the traveaux preparatoires4 or the early
practice of the Council. The separation of Chapter VI from VII on the
basis of a distinction between "powers to recommend" and "powers to
decide" lacks textual support since recommendations are authorized
under Chapter VII, Article 39, and because decisions can arguably
be made under Chapter VI. Indeed, Article 27 refers to decisions under
Chapter VI. Early debates indicate that action taken under Chapter
VI was considered binding. 5 In addition, the traveaux preparatoires
record the rejection of an amendment which would have limited the
obligatory nature of Security Council decisions to Chapters VI, VII,
VIII and XII, much less to Chapter VII alone. 8
The third approach, a contextual one, was first proposed by the
Secretary-General who, in 1947, provided a legal opinion that the powers
of the Security Council were not limited to those specifically enumerated
in Article 24, but included general powers in the field of international
peace and security as well. Members were obligated, he addea, to sub-
mit to actions taken under either general or specific powers upon appli-
cation of Article 25." This argument was accepted during the 1971
South West Africa litigation by the I.C.J. The Court pointed out the
obvious inaccuracy in reading Article 25, which is placed in Chapter V,
as applying only to Chapter VII Also, if Chapter VII were to be the
sole beneficiary of Article 25 application, Articles 48 and 49 in Chapter
VII would have been superfluous.3 Instead of relying upon specific
invocations of Chapter VII, the I.C.J. argued that each resolution should
be examined in light of its terms, the discussions leading to it, the
Charter provisions invoked, and in general, all circumstances which
might assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolutions of
the Security Council.4"
U The "legislative history" of treaties.
35The Corfu Channel Incident (1947), the Greek Frontier Dispute (1947), the
Trieste Question (1947) and the Kashmir Dispute (1957) all involved assertions that
"recommendations" had to be accepted by Members in conformity with Article 25. Hig-
gins, supra note 32, at 279-82. In the Greek Frontier case the United States specifically
argued that Article 34 in Chapter VI was a binding obligation. 2 U.N. SCOR 1124,
1522-26 (1947).
-6 Doc. 597, III/1/30, 11 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 393-95 (1945).
37 2 U.N. SCOR 44, 45 (1947).
-" 1971 S.W.A. Case, supra note 2, at 53, 113.
29 Id. These Articles require members of the United Nations to carry out the deci-
sions of the Security Council regarding mandatory enforcement actions.
40 The present U.S. position is unclear. At the U.N.'s inception the United States
favored the Article 24 general approach. SECRETARY OF STATE, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE RESULT OF THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFER-
ENCE, June 26, 1945, Dep't State Pub. No. 2349, Conf. Ser. 71 at 79 (1945). In practice
[Vol 50:83
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Whether resolutions are based upon Article 24 general powers,
which the I.C.J. prescribes, or the specific Article 24 approach,4 1 the
I.C.J.'s formula for determining whether or not an action is mandatory
will still have to be applied. In both cases, it will te necessary to deter-
mine whether the delegates considered the resolution to be mandatory.
The only way to do this would be to analyze the debates and the text of
the resolution for evidence of intent. Therefore, there is little method-
ological difference between the general Article 24 approach of the I.C.J.
and the specific Article 24 position. While there may be a practical
argument that limiting obligatory measures to those voted under
Chapter VII enhances understanding of what is at stake in a heated
debate, it generally is not difficult to determine from the records of the
debate and the terms of the resolutions whether cor not the resolution
was intended to be mandatory.
A potential disadvantage in using either the specific or general
Article 24 theories of mandatory obligations to enforce Security Council
decisions involves Article 2(7),42 which provides that the United Na-
tions may not interfere with the domestic jurisdiction of member coun-
tries. Article 2(7), by specific reference, forbids the use of this de-
it has supported a theory of binding obligations arising, inter ella, out of Chapters VI,
VII, and XI. See respectively 2 U.N. SCOR 1124, 1522-26 (1947), 56 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 140-43 (1967) (address by Ambassador Goldberg before the American Ass'n of
Law Schools at Washington, D.C., Dec. 29, 1966), and id. at 143. However, while the
Chapter VII approach is increasingly discredited, the United States may be moving to-
ward its acceptance. Judge Fitzmaurice's dissenting opinion in the 1971 South West
Africa Case, at 297, 298 noted that the U.S. representative had argued that sanctions
which member states would be bound to apply to an offending state could only be taken
under Article 39. It is possible that he was referring to sanctions as a term of art, not
as a synonym for enforcement. On the other hand, the counsel may have been develop-
ing a distinction between the obligations of members, parties to the dispute, and the
obligations of the other nations to honor or implement the Security Council decision re-
garding the dispute. This distinction is supported by U.S. practice since on the occasions
in which the United States has argued that an obligation arosu out of non-article VII
sources, the debate centered upon whether the parties to the dispute were obligated to
submit to the Security Council directive. The distinction, if it is intended, is fatuous.
If the Security Council is entitled to make decisions in an area then all nations are bound
to that decision by way of Article 25 whether or not they are parties to the dispute. While
the decision itself may contain no specific action for noninvolved members, Article 25
contains an implied obligation of states not to interfere with the Security Council's
handling of the situation and, presumably, to facilitate it diplomatically, or otherwise,
if possible.
41 The distinction between these positions may be illuminated by analogy to the
"general welfare-delegated powers" dispute surrounding federal powers in the United
States.
42Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or shall require the Members to submit such nratters to settlement
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
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fense to avoid obligations incurred by application of Chapter VII sanc-
tions. No such exception to Article 2(7) exists for action under Article
24 or another Chapter. The rationality of the domestic jurisdiction clause
in this area is questionable, however, in actual practice. Where actions
constitute a threat to peace and security, they have already exceeded
the bounds of domestic jurisdiction so the final clause of Article
2(7) is superfluous for any mandatory Security Council resolution."'
Particularly with regard to problems of human rights and racial dis-
crimination, Article 2 (7), in practice has been overtaken by a realization
that human rights problems can never be within the sole jurisdiction of
one country." On the other hand, despite the clear prohibition of the
use of the doctrine when enforcement measures are contemplated, domes-
tic jurisdiction has been put forth as a defense even when Chapter VII
powers have been invoked.,5 Since the efficacy of the Chapter VII
exception is doubtful anyway, its failure to include reference to Article
24 should not limit the extension of Article 24 resolutions in domestic
situations.
An example of the Chapter VII approach is the Rhodesian sanc-
tions upon which the Diggs litigation was based. Security Council
Resolution 232,46 adopted December 16, 1966, was the first employment
of mandatory sanctions voted specifically under Chapter VII power.
It imposed mandatory selective sanctions against importation by United
Nations members and nonmembers of a wide range of mineral and
agricultural products, and imposed an arms and vehicle embargo.
Superseding Resolution 232 on May 29, 1968, Security Council Reso-
lution 253 1 imposed comprehensive mandatory sanctions against all
commodities from Rhodesia, and instructed member states to avoid
diplomatic relations, to restrain their citizens and corporations from
any business dealings with Rhodesia, and to prevent investment in
:Rhodesia. The official U.S. position regarding these two resolutions
was that they were authorized by Chapters VII and XI (Declaration
Regarding Non-Self Governing Territories):4
The court of appeals in Diggs did not question the statement of the
43 See McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of
International Concern, 62 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (1968).
44 Wright, National Courts and Human Rights-The Fujii Case, 45 Am. 3. INT'L L.
62, 74 (1951).
4 5 McDougal & Reisman, supra note 43, at 13-16.
46 S.C. Res. 232 (1966).
47 S.C. Res. 253 (1968).
8 56 DEP'T STATE BULL. 140, 143 (1967) (address by Ambassador Goldberg before
the American Ass'n of Law Schools at Washington, D.C., Dec. 29, 1966).
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district court that the Rhodesian embargo was randatory, 9 nor the
argument in the appellant's brief that it was mandatory under Chapter
VII and Article 25 of the Charter.0 The court focused on whether the
resolution created individual rights rather than upon the necessarily
anterior question of whether states were bound by the resolution. Prior
to Diggs a congressional act"' had had the effect of directing the Presi-
dent to issue import licenses for metallurgical chromite in violation of
the Security Council embargo of Rhodesian minecals. The suit chal-
lenged the power of the President to violate that embargo resolution
(the power of Congress to do so having been admitted). While standing
to sue was upheld for those plaintiffs who had either been physically
barred from Rhodesia or who had suffered economic damage as a
result of the Rhodesian Government's racist policies, the D.C. Court of
Appeals ultimately dismissed the case for lack of justiciability in light
of the clear intent of the congressional act to direct the President to
violate the Charter. 2 However both courts accep-ced, at least by im-
plication, that the sanctions are binding on U.S. courts unless Congress
passes conflicting legislation. It could be argued that resolutions are
binding only because they have been implemented by the United Nations
Participation Act of 1945 or by Executive orders. Neither court,
however, followed this line of reasoning. It is arguable that the courts
considered the resolution directly binding.
Perhaps one reason the Diggs court perceived no difficulty in term-
ing the embargo resolution a treaty obligation bindi-ag upon individuals
was the fact that it was based on Chapter VII. There is very little inter-
national dispute over the mandatory force of Chapter VII. But resolu-
tions based on the general Article 24 power, because its mandatory force
is internationally contested, would raise a more difficult problem for a
U.S. court. If the court should refuse to accept Article 24 as giving rise
to mandatory obligations, then neither the United States as a state,
nor its citizens as individuals, 3 would be bound by a resolution voted
under that provision. The resolution would be seen as recommendatory
4 9 Unpublished opinion available in the Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Appendix
at 35a, Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
GOBrief for Appellant at 4, Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
G1 Amendment offered by Senator Byrd to the Military Procurement Act of 1971
which amended the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act of 1939. Act of
Nov. 17, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-156, tit. v, § 503(2), 85 Stat 427, amending 50 U.S.C.
§ 98h (1951) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 98h-i (Supp. 1974)) [hereinafter cited as Byrd
Amendment].
2470 F.2d at 466.
53 Since individuals are not recognized in international law their claims are neces-
sarily derivative of the claim of the states of which they are citizens.
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only. The Namibia resolutions illustrate the problem. The Security
Council rarely makes explicit during debate the authority under which it
acts. Several resolutions of the Security Council, both prior and sub-
sequent to the I.C.J.'s 1971 South West Africa Advisory Opinion on the
legal consequences of the termination of the mandate, included both
mandatory and permissive language regarding the legal status of South
Africa in Namibia and the legal consequences of South Africa's
presence for other states."' By the International Court of Justice formula
for distinguishing mandatory from permissive resolutions, the termina-
tion itself was clearly mandatory. The debates leading up to the resolu-
tions, and the resolutions themselves definitively demonstrate that the
Security Council considered the Mandate terminated and the continued
presence of South Africa in Namibia illegal.
While there is little doubt that the paragraphs dealing with termina-
tion of the Mandate itself and the consequent illegal occupation of South
Africa were decisions made by the Security Council, the accompanying
pronouncements calling upon states to refrain from any dealings with
South Africa which would imply recognition were expressed in recom-
mendatory terms. The United States agreed that South Africa's presence
in Namibia is illegal but conditioned its support of Resolution 264 on
the Council's not applying mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII,
arguing that the situation could not sensibly or humanely be remedied
this way.55 Again in Resolution 269, the United States argued that
only steps undertaken voluntarily by individual nations could realize
the objective of Namibian independence."
In the debate preceding Resolution 301 the United States delegate
5 4 Compare the operative verbs in the following excerpts. Security Council Resolu-
tion 264, Mar. 20, 1969 (U.S. in favor) : Recognizes the General Assembly's termination
of the Mandate, and Considers South Africa's continued presence illegal; Resolution 269,
Aug. 12, 1969 (U.S. abstained) : Decides the continued occupation is an aggressive en-
croachment on the authority of the United Nations, Calls Upon States to refrain from
dealing with South Africa on behalf of Namibia; Resolution 276, Jan. 30, 1970 (U.S. in
favor) : Reaffirm G.A. 2145, S.C. Resolution 264 and Reaffirms that extention of South
Africa's laws is illegal, Declares South Africa's continued presence illegal, Calls Upon
States to refrain from dealing with South Africa implying the legality of South Africa
in Namibia; "Resolution 283, July 29, 1970 (U.S. in favor) : Reaffirms Resolutions 264
and 276, Requests all States to refrain from diplomatic or consular relations concerning
Namibia, Calls Upon States to ensure that companies cease dealings in Namibia; Resolu-
tion 301, Oct. 20, 1971 (U.S. in favor) : -Reaffirms territory of Namibia is under direct
responsibility of the United Nations, Declares South Africa's presence to be illegal and
a breach of international obligations, Agrees with the I.C.J. that Members of the United
Nations are under an obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence
and the invalidity of acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, Declares all franchises and
contracts granted by South Africa after G.A. resolution 2145 to be void.
55 1969 U.N.Y.B. 678.5 6 Id. at 684.
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specifically approved the I.C.J.'s conclusion that South Africa is legally
obligated to withdraw and that states are legally obligated to refrain
from dealings with South Africa which could imply recognition or lend
support to the administration. 7 However, he went on to say that, as to
the specific obligations suggested by the court" (which prohibited inter
alia bilateral treaties with South Africa involving Namibia, and diplo-
matic missions in or for Namibia), the United States "considers states
free to take appropriate action to protect their own citizens and to as-
sist the people of Namibia."' 9 The United States representative seemed
to be attempting to reserve the right to individual states to define the
legal consequences of the termination for states not parties to the dis-
pute6" despite the fact that precisely this question had been put before the
I.C.J. for resolution with the affirmative vote of the United States.
In an oral statement before the I.C.J. during the 1971 South West
Africa litigation, the Legal Advisor to the State Department reminded
the Court that the request for an advisory opinion on the termination
of the Mandate asked only what the legal consequences were for states,
not for individuals.
In many cases it will be for the courts of the member States to
determine, in accordance with recognized principles of private
and public international law, the effect on private relationships
and transactions of acts taken by the Government of South Africa
on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the adoption of Resolu-
tion 2145.61
Despite the caveat that the United States considers itself free to take
any action necessary, as a result of its affirmative votes on the series of
resolutions leading up to the termination of the Mandate," and the
explanation of its position during the proceedings before the I.C.J. and
57U.N. Doc. S/PV 1598, at 8-10 (1971).
58 1971 S.W.A. Case, supra note 2, J f 133, 118, 122, 123, 125 at 58, 54-56.
59 U.N. Doc. S/PV 1598, at 11 (1971).
60 See note 40 supra.
61 1971 S.W.A. Case, supra note 2, 2 I.C.J. Pleadings 498 (1071).
20 On May 19, 1970, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations announced before
the General Assembly that the United States would henceforth officially discourage in-
vestment by U.S. nationals in Namibia, would refuse to grant Export-Import Bank
guarantees for trade with Namibia, and would not extend protection of the United States
to U.S. nationals who acquire rights in Namibia after the adoption of G.A. Resolution
2145 (Oct. 22, 1966) against the claims of a future government of Nanibia. 62 DFp'T
STATE BULL. 709 (1970). The policy was also announced by the Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 20, 1970. Id. at 718. The U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations again affirmed this policy during the Security Council debates on
Resolution 301. "Investors were informed of this new policy and investment has in fact
been inhibited." U.N. Doc. S/PV 1598 at 11 (1971).
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the debates on Resolution 301, the United States is bound under interna-
tional law to do nothing which would imply recognition of South
Africa's presence in Namibia. 3
Plaintiffs in American Metal Climaxe4 could have put forth an
argument along the lines developed above to prove that the termination
of the Mandate by the General Assembly and the Security Council is
binding not only upon South Africa but also upon the United States.
As previously indicated, the United States Executive has take the posi-
tion that the consequences enumerated by the I.C.J. and listed as recom-
mendations in the resolutions are not binding. However, no domestic
court should lightly disregard the ruling of the I.C.J., even in an ad-
visory opinion, since such an opinion carries great weight in interpreting
the obligations of states arising out of treaty commitments. 5 In addi-
tion, the federal and state judiciaries are not, in the area of treaty inter-
pretation, bound to the construction given by the Executive, although
his opinion is entitled to great weight. Until now no conflict has ap-
peared in an internationally sensitive case." As the U.S. representative
argued before the I.C.J., the courts are free to determine whether a
treaty obligation arose as a result of the United States' vote in the
Security Council on the termination of the Mandate. Or, rather than
accept the I.C.J.'s interpretation, a domestic court could determine for
itself the consequences in international law, as opposed to treaty law,
flowing from the termination of the Mandate. Thus, the actual domestic
impact within members states could be determined not by reference to
treaty obligations, but by reference to international law which may look
even to a recommendatory resolution as a source of law-creating expec-
tations." Because the subsequent resolutions were recommendatory as
to the consequences for states, they are not treaty obligations pursuant
to the Charter. They may, however, be the consequences of the manda-
tory termination which international law imposes, as the I.C.J. held.
It will be up to domestic courts to determine whether the termination
resolution obligates the United States under existing principles of
63 In addition to the treaty argument, this assertion can be based upon principles of
estoppel recognized in international law by Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933]
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53.
14 Schott v. American Metal Climax, Inc., Civil No. C73-1665 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 11,
1973).
65 An advisory opinion by the I.C.J. is considered an authoritative guide on the points
of law involved in the case. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
706 (1973).
6 Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75
YALE L.J. 517, 546 n.102 (1966).
67 See Falk, supra note 9, at 782.
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international law, whether the recommendatory resolutions have given
rise to a norm of customary law, or whether notwithstanding the recom-
mendatory language, the resolutions were decisions of the Security
Council and therefore binding as treaty obligations. Thus, mandatory
Security Council resolutions may have either a direct effect on national
law through treaty law, as in the Rhodesian case, or they may have an
indirect effect by compelling the application of international law in U.S.
courts.
NoN-SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES AND THE
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
Non-Self-Executing Treaties
Once it is determined that a resolution is a treaty obligation, ques-
tions of interpretation will arise. A binding decision by the Security
Council has been before a U.S. court only in Diggs v. Shultz. 8 How-
ever, other Charter provisions having impact on the rights of individual
citizens have been before the Supreme Court and the analysis applied
in these cases will help determine the perspective from which mandatory
resolutions are viewed. The Supreme Court has never ruled directly
on litigation involving the Charter even when the issue was before it,6"
though in concurring opinions Justices Black and Douglas, and Murphy
and Rutledge, have implied that the Charter holds a prestigous position
in U.S. law. 6 The bulk of interpretation has been done by lower
federal and state courts. From these courts two lines of cases have
emerged-those attempting to use the "human rights" provision of the
Charter to invalidate state laws, federal and state administrative regu-
lations, or private contracts; and those asserting the legal personality of
the United Nations within the United States to secure contract damages.71
The human rights litigation is based on the Charter's preamble,
Article 1 (Purposes and Principles), Article 2 (Duty of Members to
Act in Accordance with Principles), Article 55 (Objectives of Economic
and Social Cooperation), Article 56 (Pledge of Members to Act to
Achieve the Article 55 Purposes) and Article 62 (Powers of the
Economic and Social Council). Proponents argue that these provisions
18470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
19 Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1947), rev'd on other grounds, 334 U.S.
24 (1948); Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947), rev'd on other
grounds sub norn. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).70 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647, 650 (1948).
71 United Nations Charter provisions involved in domestic litigation have been the
preamble, articles 1, para. 3; 2, para. 2; 41; 55; 56; 62; 100; 104; 105 and Chapter XII.
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have legal force equal to that of a federal statute because Article VI,
Section 272 of the United States Constitution places treaties and statutes
on an equal basis in U.S. law. Alternatively, they rely on the Charter
as an authoritative expression of United States public policy. Armed
with these arguments, plaintiffs have challenged alien land laws, "
racially restrictive covenants, 74 immigration regulations,75 voting re-
quirements of literacy in English,"8 and statutes prohibiting interracial
marriages.77 A frivolous (or desperate) attempt to avoid a Mississippi
statute prohibiting possession of liquor even asserted that Article 62
had given the Economic and Social Council complete jurisdiction over
regulation of alcoholic beverages. 8
Ultimately all of these claims were rejected. The earlier opinions
suffer from a lack of analytical rigor in that they employ none of the
theories of treaty interpretation which might have justified their denials
of the legal efficacy of the Charter in U.S. courts. Admittedly these
assorted claims were normally only collateral issues, but occasionally
their validity was denied with the bare assertion that the Charter has no
impact on private rights. The Supreme Court of Michigan, for example,
maintained:
We do not understand it to be a principle of law that a treaty
between sovereign nations is applicable to the contractual rights
between citizens of the United States when a determination of
those rights is sought in the State Courts. . . . [T]hese pro-
nouncements are merely indicative of a desirable social trend and
an objective devoutly to be desired by all well-thinking peoples. 79
This position is clearly erroneous. A treaty is determinative of indi-
72 This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
73 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647, 650 (1948) (concurring); Sei Fujii v.
State, 217 P.2d 481, relearing denied, 218 P.2d 595 (Cal. App. 1950), aff'd on other
grounds, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) ; Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d
569 (1949).74 Hurd v. Hodges, 162 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1947), rev'd on other grounds, 334 U.S.
24 (1948); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 245 Ia. 147, 60 N.W.2d 110
(1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), cert. dismissed on rehearing, 349
U.S. 70 (1955) ; Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W.2d 638 (1947) ; Kemp v. Rubin,
188 Misc. 310, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct 1947).
7 Hitai v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 343 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1965);
Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1959).
78 Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).77 Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 211, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
78 Dossett v. State, 211 Miss. 650, 52 So. 2d 490 (1951).
79 Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 628, 25 N.W.2d 638, 644 (1947).
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vidual rights if it indicates dearly enough that it is intended to have that
effect, and the Charter was submitted to the Senate as a treaty. The
Supreme Court itself has stated:
A treaty, . . . by the express words of the Constitution, is the
supreme law of the land, binding alike National -Md state Courts,
and is capable of enforcement, and must be enforced by them in
the litigation of private rights8
Other courts argued that Article 2(7) (which prevents the United
Nations from intervening in the domestic jurisdiction of members) of
the Charter itself precluded application of the specific provisions by
domestic courts."' Several scholars of international law, and the I.C.J.,
however, have maintained that Article 2(7) does not limit the com-
petence of the United Nations with respect to human rights because
members have assumed international obligations with respect to those
human rights. Given these undertakings the interpretation, application
and enforcement of these obligations have ceased to be a matter ex-
clusively within the domestic jurisdiction of nations.'
The early opinions tended to dismiss the entire Charter as irrele-
vant. Later cases at least recognized that the Charter provisions should
be examined individually. Some provisions, such as Article 104 (func-
tional legal capacity of the United Nations) and Article 105 (privileges
and immunities of United Nations Mission and Staff), are self-
executing 3 on their face. The Charter has been invoked successfully
to establish the legal rights of the United Natiors as an institution
vis-A-vis the government, U.S. citizens, and corporations. Articles 104
and 105 have been held to authorize United Nations organizations
to sue U.S. companies for contract violations;84 permit immunity from
prosecution for members of the United Nations M1ission"5 or Staff ;S
8 0 Maiorano v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 213 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1909). If the Michigan
court understood that treaty law had no direct impact on states, it was still wrong, though
cases decided later may have made that more apparent. See Zschtrnig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429 (1968) ; Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 198 (1961) ; cf. United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1937).
61 Dossett v. State, 211 Miss. 650, 52 So. 2d 490 (1951) ; Ktmp v. Rubin, 188 Misc.
310, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct 1947).
82 For citations see Wright, supra note 44, at 74 n.35.
83 The self-executing doctrine refers to a principle of foreign relations law which
holds that certain international agreements can have no domestic effect until implemented
by Congress. The most obvious example would be a treaty which required a congres-
sional appropriation. For fuller discussion see text at notes 92-110 and notes 97, 104
infra.84 International Refugee Organization v. Republic S.S. Corp., 189 F.2d 858 (4th Cir.
1951) Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1950).85United States v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (dictum).
80United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (dictum); United
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and permit the City of New York to provide special facilities for the
United Nations Headquarters.87 Judge Edgerton of the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia also held that Articles 100 (Prohibi-
tion of Member States Influence on United Nations Staff) and 105,
together with United Nations regulations passed in conformity with
those articles, prevented application of limited U.S. definitions of
privileged testimony in United States courts when staff members were
involved, and conferred greater privilege on U.S. citizens questioned
about knowledge obtained as a United Nations employee."
Edgerton's rationale was that the United Nations could not func-
tion effectively nor fulfill its stated purpose were such privilege not
granted its employees. The same theory was the basis of the suit noted
above brought to determine the capacity of a U.N. organization to
sue on a contract.89 This functional 'approach, echoed in the Reparations
Case,90 has never been extended beyond cases involving the organization's
legal personality. However, the enforcement of the decisions of the
organization with regard to peace and security, the protection of which
was the primary objective of the Charter, is at least important to the
survival of the United Nations, as an institution, as is its legal capacity
in the world community.
The first courts to analyze in any depth the binding effect of the
Charter in U.S. law were the Second District Court of Appeals of
California and that state's Supreme Court in Sei Fujii v. State' Sei
Fujii was a challenge to the California Alien Land Laws which pro-
hibited an alien who could not qualify for permanent resident status
from owning land within the state. The case presented a two-pronged
attack asserting violations of the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution and the human rights provisions of the United
Nations Charter. The California Court of Appeals reasoned that it
could not decide the case on constitutional grounds, because the United
States Supreme Court had upheld alien land laws several times and
had only recently decided a case on technical grounds which had pre-
States v. Coplon, 84 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (dictum); County of Westchester v.
Ranollo, 187 Misc. 777, 67 N.Y.S.2d 31 (City of New Rochelle 1947) (dictum).
87 Curran v. City of New York, 191 Misc. 229, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
88 United States v. Keeney, 218 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (Judge Edgarton wrote
the opinion but pointed out that the other justices did not concur with him on this point).
89 Id. at 845; Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal.
1950).
190 Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, [1949] I.CJ. 174.
W1217 P.2d 481, rehearing denied, 218 P.2d 595 (Cal. App. 1950), aff'd on other
grounds, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
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sented fully the constitutional issues.92 Instead, it struck down the
California statute on the theory that it conflicted with the preamble,
Articles 1, 2, 55 and 56 of the Charter which were held paramount to
state law because of the Supremacy Clause.93
On appeal, the California Supreme Court, handing down what
has become the leading case on domestic application of the Charter,
affirmed the holding on equal protection grounds, but rejected the lower
court's application of the Charter. The Charter provisions were held
not to be self-executing because they did not sufficiently indicate, on their
face, an intention to prescribe a rule that, standing alone, would be
enforceable by the courts. Neither the language used nor the preparatory
history of the Charter, the court argued, showed the requisite intention
of its framers to confer legal rights and obligations upon individual
citizens. Most courts subsequent to Sei Fujii have relied on or referred
to its non-self-executing arguments to reject human rights cases.94
There are two answers to the California Supreme Court's argu-
ment in Sei Fujil. First, it misapplied the doctrine of non-self-executing
treaties as that doctrine is applied in domestic law. While the doctrine
is common to both national and international law, ,t is not identical in
both contexts." In international law, the doctrine does indeed refer to
whether the treaty provision is intended to have immediate effect on
individuals, or whether it is a direction to a political officer.96 In U.S.
law the doctrine has assumed a separation of powers gloss and in a
sense has become part of the political question doctrine. 7 Non-self-
92 Id. at 485 (referring to Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948)).
93 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2. For text see note 72 supra.
04 Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 720-25, 242 P.2d 617, 61-22 (1952). The lower
Sei Fujil case caused a major uproar over the treaty power and was one stimulus for the
notorious but ill-fated Bricker amendment, S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952),
which attempted to restrict that power. Several critical articls appeared, among the
most influential of which was M. 0. Hudson, Charter Provsio 's on Human Rights in
Ainerican Law, 44 Au. J. INT'L L. 543 (1950). Since then more approving appraisals
have gained recognition in L. SoHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERIATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HuMAN RIGHTS 945 (1973) and Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and the
Human Rights Clauses of the Charter, 66 Azt. J. INT'L L. 337 (1972).
!95 Compare Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) with Advisory
Opinion on the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, [1928] P.C I.J., ser. B, No. 15.
DO See note 104 infra.
W7Historically, treaties were monarchical instruments governng matters of state and
international concern. Whether they had impact on individuals could hardly have been
of consequence given the supremacy of authority residing in the monarch over all citizens
in both their public and private capacities. As constitutional forms of government de-
veloped which separated legislative functions, such as representition of private rights,
from executive ones such as treaties, the treaties continued to be restricted in application
to states, not individuals. But then the distinction had become meaningful. Something
more than a normal treaty was needed to confer rights on individuals which would be
binding on a domestic court. That requirement became the self-executing doctrine. It
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executing treaties involve the issue of competence of the maker. Quincy
Wright contends:
In practice, the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties has been
applied only to preserve the constitutional rights of the political
organs of the Federal Government-the President, the Congress,
and especially the House of Representatives which does not
normally participate in treaty making-in matters which for
historical or practical reasons have been considered particularly
within the competence of these organs.9"
Sei Fujii relies heavily upon the absence of intent. But "intent"
is an inadequate criterion to distinguish executed from executory
treaties. This is demonstrated by the fact that no treaty, regardless
how clear the intent or specific the language, which tried to declare an
act a criminal offense could be self-executing.9 Neither could a treaty
which required appropriation.' Both of these powers are specifically
reserved to the Congress. Thus, it would appear that the non-self-
executing doctrine may have arisen as a check on the broad executive
power to conclude treaties.
Non-self-executing treaty analysis should not be used to decide
questions involving the compatibility of treaty provisions and state
law because the policies which the self-executing doctrine serves are
those of separation of powers between the federal branches-not
policies concerning federal-state comity. Whether or not the treaty
provision is self-executing, it is a statement of federal policy01t which
should prevail over conflicting state law according to Zschernig v.
arose as individuals began to play a more extensive role in public affairs. The presump-
tion against treaties having individual impact was rebuttable if the treaty clearly ex-
pressed an intention that individuals would be affected. Such an intention on the part of
the Executive would not conflict with the legislative competence over private rights where
the legislature had to approve the treaty before it had any domestic effect anyway. In
Europe the legislatures normally must consent in advance to a treaty (as the Senate must
in the United States before a .treaty can have international effect). But in the United
States, where consent of the legislature is not required to give domestic effect if the
treaty is self-executing, the self-executing doctrine protected the prerogatives of the
legislature. See Wright, The Legal Nature of Treaties, 10 Am. J. INT'L L. 706, 711-18
(1916).
" Wright, supra note 44, at 68.
19 See The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925); cf. The Estrella, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 289 (1819), United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816) ; United
States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); see also 5 G. HACKWORTH.
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 490 (1943); Wright, The Legal Nature of Treaties, 10
Am. J. INT'L L. 706, 719 (1916). But see Warren, New Light in the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of r789, 37 HARv. L. REV. 49, 73 (1923) ; 2 J. MooRE, DIGEsT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 978 (1906).
"00 But see 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTmNATIONAL LAW § 490 (1943).
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Ailler1 2 and Kolovrat v. Oregon. 1
A domestic court's search for the intention of the signatories leads
to other conceptual difficulties. The question to be asked of a treaty
provision is whether it was intended to have "immediate" effect. Under
the "intent" theory surely the intention of the other parties to the treaty
would be relevant. Yet in most countries the treaty must be specifically
incorporated by legislative act after ratification since those countries
have no equivalent of the Supremacy Clause which accomplishes that
incorporation for the United States. While incorporation and imple-
mentation are not necessarily identical doctrines,' 4 a treaty promulgated
under a system requiring incorporation could not "intend" to have
"immediate" domestic effect. "Intent" analysis is inapplicable to the
question of self-executing treaties where multilateral treaties, like the
Charter, bring together countries with differing constitutional provi-
sions on the domestic effect of treaties, and where those provisions pre-
clude a treaty from having immediate domestic force.
Second, if, as the Sei Fujii decision implied,"5 precision is evi-
dence of justiciability, rather than intent, and if precision is provided
after the treaty becomes effective, the formerly ex.!cutory provision is
executed by those subsequent agreements. It may be argued that what-
101 SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 94, at 947.
It is Quincy Wright's contention that in no case other than Foster v. Neilson, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), later repudiated on other grounds in United States v. Perche.
man, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833), has a treaty protecting private rights been rejected in
favor of state law on the grounds that the treaty was not s3elf-executing. Wright,
supra note 44, at 66.
102389 U.S. 429 (1968).
103366 U.S. 187 (1961).
104 Incorporation is not the same as implementation. In Germany, the courts have
held provisions of GATT to be non-self-executing even though GATT has been incor-
porated into German law. Risenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-,xecuting Treaties and
GATT, 65 Am. J. INT'L L. 548 (1971); see Schlilter, The Domesfic Status of the Human
Rights Clauses of the United Nations Charter, 61 CALIF. L. Rr-€. 110, 131 (1973). By
way of explanation, analogies are sometimes drawn to administrative law where a statute
providing for a minimum price of wheat is to be carried out by regulations of the Secre-
tary of Agriculture. The statute is not enforceable until the rules are promulgated, but
it is still the law of the land. Part of the "law" is that right3 accrue only when the
Secretary acts. Note, When Are Treaties Self-Executing?, 31 NEa. L. REv. 463, 467
(1952). Where a statute is involved, however, a party has the opportunity of bringing
mandamus against the agency to compel it to implement the statute according to the con-
gressional directive. If this interpretation of the self-executing doctrine is correct, then
consistency would require a mandatory injunction to lie against the appropriate executive
department for failure to implement an executive agreement which the Executive has
negotiated in an international organization. Cf. the impoundment cases: State Highway
Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973); Community Action Programs Execu-
tive Directors Ass'n v. Ash, 365 F. Supp. 1355 (D.N.J. 1973) ; National Council of Com-
munity Mental Health Centers v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1973).
105 Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 722-23, 242 P.2d 617, 621 (1952).
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ever absence of specificity existed upon passage of the Charter, that
specificity has since been provided. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.. has been called an authoritative interpretation of the
human rights provisions of the Charter.0 7 Additional interpretations
are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 08 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.'
Thus, the Sei Fujii court should have considered the specificity of Article
17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which prescribes.
that everyone has the right to own property and that no one should
be arbitrarily deprived of it. These and many United Nations resolu-
tions on human rights, while not treaty obligations in themselves, have
become over the years the international customary norm regarding
human rights. They easily provide the requisite precision of language
to make the rights guaranteed in the Charter justiciable."' In so far
as justiciability turns on precision, international action, not domestic
implementation, should suffice.
This extended analysis of the potentially executory nature of certain
Charter provisions underlines a problem for mandatory resolutions.
Chapter VII, the most commonly cited Charter provision capable of
giving rise to Security Council decisions, was specifically implemented
by the United Nations Participation Act. The fact of passage and the
debates revealed a general belief in Congress that Chapter VII was not
self-executing. By analogy it could be argued that all mandatory charter
provisions are not self-executing and must be specifically implemented
by Congress before they can take domestic effect.
The United Nations Participation Act of 1945' 11 delegates con-
gressional power to the President to impose a complete or partial eco-
nomic and communication blockade and to impose penalties on U.S.
citizens who violate the embargo. But the Act authorizes such action
only if sanctions are voted by the Security Council in pursuance of
Article 41 (economic sanctions in Chapter VII). In this respect invo-
cation of some Security Council actions under Article 24 or Chapters
VI, VIII or XII could be disadvantages for litigants seeking to uphold
Security Council resolutions in U.S. courts because they would not be
implemented.
106 G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
107 Bleicher, supra note 9, at 458-65.
108 G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
109 Id. at 49.
110 For extensive analysis of the self-executing doctrine in relation to Sei Fujii, see
Schliter, supra note 104.
"122 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1970).
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The existence of congressional implementation is not a clear indi-
cation, however, of the necessity for implementation." 2 If the self-
executing doctrine is based on competence to pass hLws, it can be argued
that charter provisions may be self-executing despite the United Nations
Participation Act because the President has power in foreign commerce
derived from his foreign relations power. In many fields congressional
and executive responsibilities overlap; thus the mere existence of the
United Nations Participation Act is not clear evidence that congres-
sional implementation would be necessary if enforcement measures were
to be taken under Article 24. The Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law observes:
The mere fact, however, that a Congressional power exists does
not mean that the power is exclusive so as to preclude the making
of a self-executing treaty within the area of that power. Thus,
the fact that Congress has the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations does not mean that the making of a self-execut-
ing treaty dealing with foreign commerce is precluded; in fact,
many provisions in treaties dealing with foreign trade and com-
merce are self-executing."13
Even if otherwise self-executing, however, an Article 24 resolu-
tion would still be executory if it contemplated criminal penalties for
its violation. The United Nations Participation Act delegated to the
President the authority to impose criminal penalties for violation of
Article 41 sanctions. Without such congressional implementation,
such penalties would be precluded since, under Article I, Section 8,
Clause 10114 of the United States Constitution, Congress has exclusive
power to define crimes and impose penalties. Thus, treaties which
impose criminal penalties cannot be self-executing because the Presi-
dent has no independent authority to enact criminal penalties for "in-
ternational crimes.""' Unless the 1945 Act were amended to read
decisions of the Security Council, instead of enforcement measures
under Article 41, the Executive would have to return to Congress after
12 The fact that article 41 was implemented by this Act does not necessarily provide
conclusive evidence that the treaty is executory with respect to sanctions voted under a
different article, or even that execution was needed in that case. In Balfour, Guthrie &
Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1950), and Curren v. City of New
York, 191 Misc. 229, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206, 212 (Sup. Ct. 1947), Articles 104 and 105 were
held to be self-executing despite the fact that Congress had passed further implementing
legislation in the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 288-288f
(1970).
113 RESTATEMENT § 141.
"14"To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committd on high Seas, and
Offences against the Law of Nations."115 See authorities cited note 99 supra.
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each Security Council vote for authority to impose such penalties.
With the exception of the criminal sanctions, the distinction in the
Charter between Article 24 resolutions and Chapter VII resolutions
need have little effect in domestic law. A range of action is open to the
President, even under Article 41, which is not and need not be specifically
implemented by Congress.1 " Diplomatic measures, for example, are
uniquely within the President's foreign policy capacity, and measures
under Article 41 are not specifically limited to the three enumerated
ones of economic, communication and diplomatic blockade. Only eco-
nomic and communication sanctions require prior congressional dele-
gation of authority to the President, and it is likely that, should such
measures be contemplated, they would be invoked under the Chapter
VII powers anyway. Even under the Chapter VII approach implemen-
tation is not guaranteed because Congress can always withdraw the
authority granted to the President as was done with regard to strategic
materials during the Rhodesian sanctions." 7 Action under Chapter VII
will normally be taken in different situations so the question of what
would happen if Article 24 general powers were used to further a
Chapter VII purpose would probably not arise. The real problem for
domestic invocation of Security Council resolutions raised by Article
24 is also likely to arise under those Chapter VII powers which are
exercisable by the Executive alone. That problem is whether the Execu-
tive intended to create rights in U.S. citizens by his actions in the
Security Council and whether the courts will be willing to "discover"
these rights if they are ambiguous.
Theoretically a resolution calling for executive action should be
subject to the requirements of the self-executing doctrine. Yet case law
is confused over whether the implementation required by an executory
provision must be enacted by Congress or whether it could also be sup-
plied by the Executive. Dicta indicate that any of the three branches
3.1- Cf. Note, Executive Orders and the Development of Presidential Power, 17
VIL. L. REv. 688, 693 (1972).
3.1 Byrd Amendment, supra note 45.
Since treaties supersede prior legislation and since mandatory resolutions have been
interpreted as treaty obligations, it has been argued that the resolutions reaffirming the
sanctions which were passed subsequent to the Byrd Amendment should have the effect
of repealing the amendment. 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 185, 192 (1973). This analysis over-
looks the fact that the effect of the Byrd Amendment was to withdraw the congressional
delegation of power to the President to enforce Chapter VII with regard to strategic
materials. Therefore the resolutions, not having been congressionally implemented, could
have no domestic effect. If, however, the President has the constitutional power to im-
pose economic sanctions on his own, then implementation would not be needed and this
thesis would be correct. See text at notes 27-28 infra.
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could be called upon to implement a treaty.118 However, in no actual case
has a treaty provision been found to be executory where action other
than congressional has been lacking, a situation which provides support
for the thesis that the self-executing doctrine is primarily based on a
separation of powers rationale. Even if the dicta are correct, the problem
would probably never be analyzed in those terms. Rather, it would
likely be viewed as within the traditional province of the political ques-
tion doctrine.
Political Question Doctrine
The remaining obstacle to domestic invocation of United Nations
mandatory resolutions is the political question doctrine. Two situations
are likely to arise in this area. First, in situations like that in Diggs,
where Congress passed legislation which in effect ordered the President
to break a treaty, the courts must decide whether they can intervene in
a dispute between the executive and legislative branches. This separation
of powers issue raises the strict political question doctrine. The second
type of political question involves the willingness of the judiciary to
"interfere" with executive action in foreign policy." 9 Where a resolu-
tion purporting to be mandatory is accompanied or followed by ambigu-
ous executive pronouncements which arguably limit the resolution's legal
effect, the temptation of the judiciary to defer to fhe interpretation of
the Executive is strong, but should be resisted. The function of the
judiciary is to adjudicate rights of litigants, not to determine the rela-
tive powers of the three branches. But where executive action under
the treaty power has given rise to rights and legal expectations, 20 courts
can and should intervene to enforce those rights. Indeed, the principal
advantage of characterizing mandatory resolutions as treaties is that
such an approach avoids the traditional judicial deference to the Execu-
tive in foreign affairs.
It is well settled in U.S. treaty law that Congress can violate a
treaty (or a resolution passed pursuant to a treaty) by passing a later,
inconsistent statute. 2' While this does not excuse the violation in in-
ternational law, it does prevent domestic courts from applying the treaty
118 See, e.g., Head Money Cases [Edye v. Robertson], 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884);
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 272 (1796).
119 For a comparison of the strict political question and the discretionary political
question, see Scharpf, supra note 66.
120 See note 12 supra.
121 Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 483-84 (1891) ; Chae Chan Ping v.
United States [Chinese Exclusion Case], 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889) ; Whitney v. Robert-
son, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) ; Head Money Cases [Edye v. Robertson], 112 U.S. 580 (1884);
Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960).
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provision. Given the equal positions of treaty and statute in U.S. law,
such an interpretation is compelling. To preclude Congress from passing
inconsistent legislation would be to confer upon treaty law a preferred
position over statutes, which the Constitution does not prescribe. Other-
wise, a treaty which could not be terminated would have constitutional
force in U.S. law.
If a U.S. court cannot prevent Congress violating mandatory
Charter resolutions, can it prevent the President from doing so ?" The
power of the President to violate a treaty, either by failure to imple-
ment or by outright breach, is not dear. Congress can violate a treaty
because the creation of new laws is its peculiar function, but the Execu-
tive's responsibility is faithfully to execute the laws, of which treaties
are a part. The plaintiffs in Diggs, by arguing that the amendment of
the statute did not clearly direct the President to violate the Charter,
attempted to mold that case into one which would present the question
of whether the President could, on his own authority, violate a treaty.'
The court avoided ruling on this argument by concluding that the dear
intention of Congress in passing the Chrome Statute (Byrd Amend-
ment) was to violate the treaty. 2 '
122There is a distinction between the violation of a treaty and its termination which
commentators are not always careful to make as seen by the fact that some argue that
a President can violate a treaty because he can terminate it. Henldn suggests that the
President has the power to denounce or terminate treaties even in violation of their
terms. HENIUIN, supra note 16, at 460-61 n.61. Hackworth suggests the same. 5 G.
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 319, 332 (1940). Neither cites supporting
cases. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 23, Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.
1972) states:
Any confusions resulting from those statements is nothing but a matter of se-
mantics flowing from imprecise use of terminology. The "termination" or "re-
nunciation" [sic] referred to has to do with the President (consistent with
recognized principles of international practice) noting the termination of a
treaty upon its terms or as directed by Congress, or because of a breach by the
other state .... We know of no precedent for a Presidential power to violate
a treaty.
(Emphasis in original.) Termination occurs upon events specified in the treaty itself or
upon breach by the other party which causes the political departments to consider the
treaty terminated. Both Congress and the President have the power to terminate a
treaty according to these terms.
The RESTATEMENT §§ 163(a) and (b) limits the presidential power to suspend or
terminate an international agreement upon its terms or because of violation by the other
side.
123 For a similar attempt with the same conclusion see Van Der Weyde v. Ocean
Transport Co., 297 U.S. 114, 117 (1836).
114 From the records of the Senate debates it cannot be doubted that abrogation of
the Charter was indeed the objective of the sponsors and the majority of the Senate
knew it. U.S. Sanctions Against Rhodesia-Chrome, Hearings on S. 1404 Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); ARMED SERVICES
COMM., REPORT AUTHORIZING MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1972, S. Rep.
No. 359, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Senate and House Debates on the Byrd Amend-
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Dicta in two cases would indicate that either Congress or the
Executive can breach a treaty without judicial interference if the sub-
ject matter is uniquely within the power of that branch. In the Chinese
Exclusion Case'25 the courts implied that the power to violate a treaty
stems from the power of the violator to create laws in the same area.
If the treaty operates by its own force, and relates to a subject
matter within the power of Congress, it can be deemed in that
particular only the equivalent of a legislative Act to be repealed
or modified at the pleasure of Congress.128
Even more broadly, Tag v. Rogers 27 states:
Once a policy has been declared in a treaty or statute, it is the
duty of the federal courts to accept as law the latest expression of
policy made by constitutionally authorided policy-making authority.
If Congress adopts a policy that conflicts with tf e Constitution of
the United States, Congress is thus acting beyond its authority and
the courts must declare the resulting statutes to be null and void.
Whenn, however, a constitutional agency adopts a policy contrary to a
trend in international law or to a treaty or statute, the courts must
accept the latest act of that agency' 283
In both cases, however, the breaching agency was the Congress.
Drawing inferences from dicta is hazardous, but at least two interpre-
tations of this view are possible. First, a President may constitutionally
break a treaty because he has a constitutional part in its creation co-
equal with the Senate (though, of course, the Senate alone cannot over-
ride a prior statute). Or, if the President has the power to conclude a
treaty alone, i.e., by executive agreement under his constitutional au-
thority, he would have the power to breach it. Nevertheless, nothing is
ment, 117 CONG. RE passim; Note, The Rhodesian Chrome Statute: The Congressional
Response to United Nations Economic Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia, 58 V&. L.
REv. 511 (1972).
Relying on the rule of construction that statutes must be construed to avoid conflict
with prior treaties, Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 213 (1967); United
States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213 (1902); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-18 (1804), plaintiff's contention in Diggs was that the act did
not specifically direct the President to violate the resolution, but gave him the option to
maintain the Rhodesian embargo if he also embargoed chrome from Communist-controlled
countries, or removed it from the strategic stockpile list. Since the only other major
producer of chromite is the Soviet Union, and since the material is critical to the steel
industry (even though the present stockpiles are high) these options were more illusions
than valid alternatives, a fact the court pointed out. 470 F.2d at 466. To have sustained
the President's power to continue the sanction despite clear congressional direction to the
contrary would have posed the strict political question problem in starkest terms.
125 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
1261d. at 600.
127267 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1959).2 8Id. at 668 (emphasis added).
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gained by distinguishing executive agreements from treaties and con-
cluding that the President is uniquely authorized to abrogate the former
unilaterally because he alone enacted them. The distinctions between
executive agreements and treaties are too vague and too little honored
in practice for such agreements to be determinative of whether the
President has the independent power to breach. 9
With respect to United Nations Security Council resolutions, the
Executive has an effective way to avoid their legal effect. He can simply
veto them. To analogize from congressional power to violate a similar
ability on the part of the Executive is inappropriate. Congress does
not have the veto capability, so its ability to violate the treaty-resolution
is more understandable. There can be no justification for the President
to violate, or fail to implement a mandatory resolution. Once legal
rights have been created, the executive is estopped to deny them. Were
conditions to change, dictating the need for termination of the treaty,
such action could be achieved under present principles of international
law by renegotiating the agreement or resolution, rather than by breach-
ing it.
The Namibia resolutions have already given rise to litigation in-
volving the rights of a U.S. company operating in Namibia and the
rights of U.S. citizens vis-A-vis that company.' In the American Metal
Climax case a federal district court was faced with deciding whether
these resolutions have legal force cognizable by U.S. courts in deter-
mining the rights of individuals and corporatians. Perhaps it rejected
the claim because, by detailing the consequences of those resolutions
or even attempting to invoke them, the judiciary could open itself to
charges that it is interfering with executive discretion in foreign
affairs. This, however, should not be dispositive of the issue. Courts
have traditionally pointed to executive discretion in foreign affairs as
the principal example of the political question doctrine.' Such de-
129 For the ambiguity between treaties and executive agreements see Treaties and
Other International Agreements, Proposed State Dep't Reg. § 721.3, 38 FED. REa. 22084,
at 22085 (1973).
130 Schott v. American Metal Climax, Inc., Civil No. C73-1665 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 11,
1973).
13 1 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The analysis here is derived principally from
Scharpf, supra note 66.
Most cases abound with dicta that would pose no limits whatsoever on the Presi-
dent's foreign relations power. E.g.,
the conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the
Constitution to the Executive and Legislative-"the political"--Departments of
the Government, and the Property of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
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ference could be based on two possible theories. 'The first of these is
that foreign affairs cannot be reviewed by the judiciary because the
Constitution commits foreign affairs to the Executive thus precluding,
on a separation of powers rationale, the judiciary from intervening.1 8 2
The second and alternative theory is not that the judiciary is constitu-
tionally compelled to defer to the Executive, but that in many cases the
subject matter makes foreign affairs unsuitable for judicial review.
The first of these views has been subjected to criticism.'33 If it is
correct, why is the foreign affairs power so totally within the discretion
of the Executive whereas other executive powers specifically granted
by the Constitution are subject to frequent review? And, why is there
no clear evidence that the court's practice has actually conformed to
this rule? In opposition to the strict political question doctrine it has
been argued:
[I] f the "entire active conduct of foreign affairs" were entrusted
exclusively to the political departments, it would be equally
difficult to explain the numerous circumstances in which the courts
have interpreted international agreements without reference to,
and sometimes in direct conflict with the interpretation adopted by
the executive department.' 34
Unsuitability of the subject matter may be the reason for the
political question doctrine, but treaties, for the most part, have not been
regarded as unsuitable subjects. In other words treaties have not
been swallowed by the foreign affairs power which is shielded from
judicial review either by constitutional command or judicial discretion.
But the courts have traditionally had authority over interpretation of
treaties in spite of their relationship to foreign affairs 5 While the
President's interpretation is usually accorded great weight, on occasion
courts have construed treaties in a manner directly conflicting with his
prescription. 3' In the treaty field the judiciary has specifically invoked
the political question doctrine only where it would otherwise be called
upon the determine whether the treaty was valid in light of allegations
of the incompetence of the other party to ratify,3 7 or in the face of
132 HENKIN, supra note 16, at 210-16; Henldn, Vietnam in the Courts of the United
States: Political Question, 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 283 (1969); Henkin, The Constitution,
Treaties and International Human Rights, 116 U. PENN. L. Rev'. 1013 (1968).
133 Scharpf, supra note 66, at 540-51.
134Id. at 546.
131 Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899).
136 Scharpf, supra note 66, at 546 n.102.
137 Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853).
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silence from the Executive after a breach by the other party. " ' Decisions
as to who has competence to enter into an agreement with the United
States and how the United States should react to breaches by other
parties are indeed political decisions. Treaties concerning international
boundaries have similarly been viewed as political questions and thus
not subject to review by the courts."9 In terms of precedent, then, there
is no reason to hold that courts should abstain from deciding the legal
relevance of United Nations resolutions imposing mandatory obliga-
tions upon member states. These resolutions are in effect executive
agreements established pursuant to the Charter and sometimes with
specific congressional authorization, (e.g., United Nations Participation
Act). The concerns which restrain courts from ruling on foreign affairs
are not present with respect to such an agreement since, by his affirma-
tive vote or the withholding of his veto, the Executive has acknowl-
edged it to be binding upon the United States.
In the Namibia situation neither the resolutions nor the remarks
of the United States representatives reveal a clear picture of the Execu-
tive's conception of the legal consequences of the termination of the
Mandate. The State Department did issue an announcement that the
United States would not support U.S. companies investing in Namibia
after the termination in 1966 of the Mandate by the General Assembly.14
This announcement was never put in the form of an executive order,
and never published in the Federal Register. Indeed, it apparently was
only casually circulated among interested parties by the State Depart-
ment. But this announcement was prior to the U.S. statements before
the International Court of Justice concerning South West Africa and
prior to debates on Resolution 301 in which the United States defini-
tively declared its position on the termination of the Mandate. Given
the special judicial competence to determine the meaning of treaties,
and these subsequent executive statements, the initial announcement
should not be viewed as the exclusive source from which to ascertain the
legal ramifications of the withdrawal of recognition of South Africa's
authority.
138 Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913) ; Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199,
260-61 (1796). But see Scharpf, supra note 66, at 545 n.100 for opinion that this is not
an example of a political question but a correct determination on the merits under in-
ternational law.
139 Pearcy v. Stranahan, 205 U.S. 257 (1907) ; In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472 (1892);
Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890) ; United States v. Reynes, 50 U.S. (9 How.)
127 (1880); Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511 (1838); Foster v. Neilson, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
140 See note 62 supra.
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CONCLUSION
Security Council decisions promulgated in the form of mandatory
resolutions are treaty obligations justiciable in U.S. courts. If passed
under the authority of Chapter VII, the necessary congressional im-
plementation will have been provided by the United Nations Participa-
tion Act. If passed under Article 24, a resolution is self-executing
unless it is clearly addressed to the political departments or unless the
subject matter of the resolution is one which the United States Con-
stitution delegates exclusively to Congress, in which case congressional
implementation is necessary. The judicial deference shown Congress,
however, need not be extended to the Executive in light of his ability
to avoid, through the veto, the binding effect of such resolutions. Since
the policies dictating judicial deference to the Executive are not pre-
sent where treaty obligations under the Charter are involved, domestic
courts should assume an active role in enforcing such agreements.
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